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**THE POLITICS OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE POLICY
IN LATIN AMERICA**

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ABSTRACT

This article compares domestic violence policy in Argentina and Chile to show how institutional factors create opportunities and constraints for advocacy coalitions promoting policy reform. In particular, it explores why policy reform occurred in Chile but not in Argentina, arguing that women's policy agencies, in combination with other institutional factors such as political centralization and bureaucratic capacity, play a key role in creating the necessary conditions for policy change. In Chile, reforms occurred mainly due to the role of the National Women's Service, which plays a key role in policy design, coordination, and evaluation, enabling it to be crucial "insider" ally of reform advocates. In contrast, advocacy coalitions in Argentina face the challenge of confronting a decentralized federal state and a bureaucracy with very low policy capacity. Argentina's National Women's Council has few resources and very little political power within the state structure, leaving advocacy coalitions without influential insider allies.

INTRODUCTION

In the past decade, a rich literature on gender policy in Latin America has emerged (Baldez 2004; Blofield 2006; Ewig 2006; Friedman 2000; Haas 2006; Htun 2003; Rousseau 2006; Stevenson 2004). Most researchers have focused their attention on the *adoption* of women's rights policies, seeking primarily to explain why some countries adopt certain gender policies

(for example, candidate gender quotas, reproductive rights, or sexual harassment policies) while others do not. Much of this literature has been explicitly comparative. Other scholars have used single case studies to highlight the ways in which gender policies are embedded in larger policy agendas, for example, neoliberalism or national development, that ultimately shape and constrain the impact of policies aimed at improving women's well-being. While both of these research agendas have been enormously important to understanding the gendered dimensions and impact of public policy in Latin America, this article seeks to move the research agenda beyond a focus on policy adoption or an analysis of the limitations of women's rights policies. In particular, the article employs a comparative approach that explores subsequent stages of the policy process, particularly policy implementation and policy reform.

Exploring subsequent stages of the policy process is important for at least three reasons. First, while numerous countries in Latin America are adopting similar gender policies, for example, candidate gender quotas, domestic violence laws, and sexual harassment laws, the impact of these laws and policies is highly variable, depending not only on the precise content of the legislation, but also on the institutional and societal context in which these policies are implemented. As a result, similar policies can have dramatically different outcomes. For this reason, a comparative framework that addresses policy implementation and policy reform can assess the extent to which gender policies are likely to have a positive impact on women's lives.

Second, for some women's rights policies, the policy adoption stage is not necessarily the most critical or contentious stage of the policy process. Ever since the transnational women's movement succeeded in putting women's rights on the international policy agenda, there has been considerable consensus in most countries that governments ought to adopt certain kinds of gender policies, for example, policies to combat violence against women or to improve women's

access to health care. Consequently, Latin American governments gain increased domestic and international legitimacy by adopting certain kinds of policies. Unfortunately, legal rules are routinely violated with impunity due to the weakness of the rule of law in much of the region. The real problem therefore is ineffective implementation of the laws and policies that are adopted. In the words of an Argentine activist, “the [domestic violence] law is great, but if those who work with the law continue to apply it badly, then it’s as though we don’t even have a law.”¹ Clearly, political decisions made *after* a law is adopted are crucial to shaping policy outcomes.

A third reason for moving the research agenda beyond the policy adoption stage is that the configuration of state and societal actors that shape policy outcomes differs throughout the various stages of the policy cycle. In particular, while advocacy coalitions—both at the international and domestic level—play a key role in convincing governments to adopt particular policies, they have somewhat less capacity to influence the ways that policies are implemented. Policy implementation and evaluation are largely influenced by institutional factors, in particular, state capacity, bureaucratic structures, and degree of state centralization. Although advocacy coalitions continue to play a role, their role during subsequent stages of the policy process is shaped by the institutional context that they confront.

In this article, I use the contrasting case studies of Argentina and Chile to show how institutional factors create opportunities and constraints for domestic violence advocacy coalitions. I do this by exploring why policy reform² occurred in Chile but not in Argentina. I argue that women’s policy agencies, in combination with other institutional factors such as

¹ Author’s interview with María Luisa Storani (Centro de la Mujer, San Fernando), September 13, 2006, San Fernando, Argentina.

² In this article, I take “policy reform” to mean legislative reform intended to improve the original law, as well as other measures that improve upon or expand existing policy initiatives, for example, increasing budgets, and creating new programs and services.

political centralization and bureaucratic capacity, play a key role in creating the necessary conditions for policy change in the area of domestic violence. Reforms to Chile's domestic violence policy occurred mainly due to the role of the National Women's Service (SERNAM), a centralized state agency that plays a key role in policy research, design, coordination, and evaluation. In brief, SERNAM has been a crucial "insider" ally of reform advocates. Advocacy coalitions in Argentina, in contrast, face the challenge of confronting a highly decentralized federal state and a bureaucracy with very low policy capacity. More important, Argentina's National Women's Council (CNM) has few resources and very little political power within the state structure, leaving advocacy coalitions without influential insider allies.

This article has three sections. The first gives an overview of the adoption of domestic violence laws in Latin America, along with a brief discussion of their main shortcomings. The second section outlines the dynamics of policy implementation, specifying the main factors that determine how successfully policy goals will be translated into reality. In the third section, I compare the Argentine and Chilean cases, showing that federalism and weak bureaucratic institutions not only undermine the policy implementation process, but also deprive advocacy coalitions of influential insider allies that would improve their ability to politicize policy failures and build public support for policy reform.

DOMESTIC VIOLENCE POLICY IN LATIN AMERICA

The issue of violence against women was placed on the political agenda of Latin American countries due to two factors. First, women's movements, many emerging during periods of dictatorship or civil war, highlighted the gendered aspects of political violence and also successfully politicized issues, such as domestic violence, that had previously been considered

private matters. Second, the demands of local women's movements were supported and legitimized by transnational developments, particularly the growing global awareness of the problems of gender inequality. At the 1993 United Nations World Conference on Human Rights (Vienna), women's rights were explicitly recognized as human rights, and the conference concluded with the Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women (Kardem 2004; Waylen 2007). A regional treaty emerged shortly after the Vienna conference, translating the global norm against violence against women into practice in Latin America. The 1994 Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment, and Eradication of Violence against Women declares all forms of gender violence to be human rights violations, and obligates all signatories to take action by implementing legislation that addresses domestic violence. Even more significant, the treaty establishes monitoring mechanisms that permit individuals and groups to bring complaints to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights in cases where states fail to comply with the obligations set out by the treaty (Hawkins and Hume 2002). By 1998, all Latin American states had signed and ratified the convention.

Latin American governments soon responded to lobbying by women's movements and to their treaty obligations, with most states adopting domestic violence legislation in the mid-1990s (although Peru had done so in 1993). Argentina and Chile passed laws in 1994, and most other countries followed suit between 1995 and 1998. Brazil was the regional outlier, waiting until 2004 to adopt domestic violence legislation, despite being a regional (and indeed, world) leader in terms of the creation of women's police stations for victims of violence (see Santos 2004). But, while all states in the region have adopted laws and policies on domestic violence, scholars have identified a range of problems that undermine the laws' effectiveness, from poor design to arbitrary implementation and insufficient budgets. One of the most common criticisms of

domestic violence laws in Latin America is that most establish family violence as a civil rather than a criminal matter, designating family tribunals or civil courts as the key authority. As a result, penalties for domestic violence are seldom severe enough to send a strong message that such acts are unacceptable (Rioseco Ortega 2005). Some countries, including Brazil, Dominican Republic, Nicaragua, Uruguay and, more recently, Chile, have included domestic violence in their penal codes (Rioseco 2005, 68-73), while others only refer cases to criminal courts when they are “severe” enough to be classified as assault or homicide (Macaulay 2005). All too frequently, decisions about whether civil or criminal courts acquire authority in domestic violence cases are made in an arbitrary manner, often due to ambiguous legislation and the subjective preferences of police and judicial officials (Guerrero Caviedes 2002; Macaulay 2005).

Another frequent criticism of the region’s domestic violence laws derives from the ideological climates in which they emerged. Despite the successes of Latin American feminist movements in challenging the idea that domestic violence is a “private” matter, Latin American societies continue to place a high value on family unity. As a result, most laws place considerable emphasis on keeping families together, rather than punishing abusers with prison sentences or removing them from the family home as a protective measure. At least eight countries require conciliation as an obligatory first step in the process (although Chile’s reformed law removes this obligation). Argentina’s law requires that a judge ordering preventive measures—such as removing an aggressor from the family home—must summon family members for compulsory mediation within forty-eight hours (Bressa and Schuster 2003; Macaulay 2005, 106). Fiona Macaulay argues that mandatory conciliation is highly problematic because “it re-naturalizes domestic violence by implying that a couple can, or should, be reconciled even when one systematically abuses the other” (110; see also Boestan 2006, 259).

Other authors note that the conciliation process fails to take into account the power asymmetries that are so central to the dynamic between abuser and victim (Rioseco Ortega 2005, 22-23). The preference for laws that incorporate counseling and conciliation emerges from the fact that the majority of laws are framed in such a way that the primary good to be protected is the *family unit* rather than the *individual* at risk of violence (Larraín 1999; Macaulay 2005). In a region dominated by Catholicism, where religious groups often mobilize in opposition to perceived threats to Catholic values, it is not surprising that domestic violence laws have prioritized the protection of the family over individual women's rights.

The conceptual shortcomings of many of the region's laws on domestic violence complicate the implementation process, in large part because ambiguity about whether a case should be addressed by civil or criminal courts ultimately leaves too much room for police and other state officials to decide—based on their own criteria—where to direct cases (Macaulay 2005, 109; Boestan 2006, 259). But policy implementation is also shaped by a series of other factors that have produced highly undesirable outcomes in much of the region. These factors are discussed below.

FROM POLICY ADOPTION TO POLICY IMPLEMENTATION

While women's movements, the global diffusion of norms on violence against women, and governments eager to improve their legitimacy at home and abroad are all key factors in explaining the adoption of domestic violence laws, they do not account for variation in policy implementation or for why policy reform has occurred in some countries but not in others.

Chile, with a fairly weak and fragmented women's movement, has seen substantial improvements in domestic violence policy in recent years, as government initiatives respond to

growing public concerns about ineffective implementation and shortcomings of the initial law. Argentina, in contrast, has seen very little policy reform, despite ongoing criticisms by well-organized women's groups and media reports that the existing laws are not being adequately implemented. Accounting for this difference requires a closer look at the policy implementation and evaluations stages, focusing on those factors that affect the translation of legislation and policy goals into reality.

According to Paul Sabatier and Daniel Mazmanian (1995), there are three main factors that shape policy implementation: (1) the complexity of the problem, (2) the extent to which the legislation adopted "coherently structures the implementation process", and (3) changing external conditions, particularly those that shape perceptions about the seriousness of the problem. In the case of domestic violence policy, the implementation process is complicated substantially by the complexity of the issue. This is a policy domain that cannot be addressed within a single department or ministry and about which there are widely differing views on appropriate state responses. Because domestic violence is a complex social problem that cannot be addressed within a single state agency, effective implementation requires strong capacity for administrative coordination across policy sectors (Guerrero Caviedes 2002). For this to occur successfully, administrative structures would have to be hierarchically organized in such a way that higher level agencies could command the lower-level agencies to implement policies in ways that policy-makers wish, rather than as the agencies themselves prefer (Theodoulou 1995). Problems of policy coordination across state agencies is a factor inherent to many gender policy areas, largely because states have historically organized their administrative structures in ways that do not take women's issues into account. Most of the stand-alone ministries (e.g., labor, finance, commerce, external affairs) represent policy areas that have traditionally been of

concern to men (Weldon 2002, 120-122). In contrast, many gender issues need to be addressed by multiple agencies, a factor that complicates effective implementation. Where policy implementation is spread across agencies rather than being the responsibility of a single department, “agencies will likely give priority to those tasks for which they already have explicit responsibility” (ibid, 120).

In the case of domestic violence policy, women’s policy agencies have tended to be the lead actors in designing and coordinating public policies on domestic violence (Guerro Caviedes 2002; Rioseco Ortego 2005). Unfortunately, in much of the region, these agencies lack the resources and power to command the more powerful ministries to adopt domestic violence policy as a priority (Franceschet 2007). Moreover, domestic violence as a policy domain includes more than a piece of legislation detailing how the authorities ought to proceed when complaints are registered. It also includes victim services, education, training, and public awareness and prevention programs. Consequently, the policy sectors involved are many, including health, justice, education, the police, along with women’s agencies (who tend to play a coordinating role). To complicate matters further, this is a policy area in which non-state actors play a large role, particularly in training and service provision. Throughout the region, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have played an important role in offering services to victims of domestic violence, including counseling, legal assistance, and in some cases, temporary refuge.³ NGOs, often staffed by experts in domestic violence, have also been involved in organizing training for public officials and public awareness campaigns (Guerrero Caviedes 2002). Thus, effective policy implementation requires an ability to coordinate the actions of state and non-state actors. According to one researcher, NGOs had developed substantial

³ The lack of government-run shelters for domestic violence victims is a serious problem throughout the region. Very few governments have committed state resources to creating shelters.

expertise and experience in domestic violence programs at the time that states got involved in setting up their own programs. However, the experience and expertise of non-state actors was not necessarily utilized effectively. In fact, when international funding was diverted to state programs rather than NGO programs, this led to competition rather than fruitful cooperation between state and non-state actors (Larraín 1999).

The above problems are compounded by the lack of state resources that governments have been willing to commit to domestic violence policies (Luciano, Esim and Duvvury 2003).⁴ The lack of resources has led to under-staffed tribunals being overwhelmed with complaints, producing lengthy wait times for complainants (thereby putting women at significant risk). Many governments also created victim services centers, providing counseling and legal services, but too few have been created, with insufficient funding to hire enough staff, hence these offices, like the courts, have been unable to keep up with demand for attention. Chile's initial domestic violence law, adopted in 1994, did not contain a budget, a factor that produced significant implementation problems (n.a. 2006, 58). In Peru, there have been reports that victims must bring their own paper to police stations if they want the police to type up and process their complaints (Boestan 2006, 258). The lack of resources assigned to domestic violence policies signifies an absence of political will on the part of governments, many of whom favor the adoption of domestic violence laws and policies for legitimacy-building purposes rather than out of serious commitment to women's rights. Political leaders can thus appear concerned with gender violence and women's equality by supporting domestic violence legislation and creating state action plans and public policies, while at the same time according these initiatives low priority in terms of resources. Because budgetary processes are far less transparent and publicly

⁴ According to the authors of a study on the budgetary implications of domestic violence laws, advocacy coalitions focused almost exclusively on the content of the laws, overlooking the details of implementation and the kind of funding the laws would require (Luciano, Esim, and Duvvury 2003, 2-3).

visible, political leaders can improve their legitimacy without having to incur significant costs. In fact, much of the funding for domestic violence programs comes from international donors or from discretionary funds within the ministries involved (Luciano, Esim and Duvvury 2003). But these kinds of funding sources are inherently unstable, something that undermines the long-term planning capabilities required for effective policy.

In sum, the main factors undermining effective implementation in this policy area are: (1) ambiguous legislation, in particular, lack of clear directives concerning jurisdiction of civil versus criminal courts, (2) the complex nature of the policy domain, requiring coordinated action across policy sectors and between state and non-state actors, and (3) insufficient budgetary resources. While these factors present a challenge for policy implementation across the region, Latin American states differ in important ways that create both opportunities and constraints for advocacy coalitions promoting policy reform. The difference between Chile and Argentina is not that Chile has done a better job than Argentina of implementing its policy goals in the area of domestic violence. Rather, the nature of Chile's bureaucratic institutions is such that policy evaluation was being conducted by capable and sufficiently resourced state agencies staffed with officials sympathetic to the goals of domestic violence advocacy coalitions. In brief, a relatively well-resourced women's policy agency, capable of coordinating policy across a variety of ministries, has been a crucial ally for advocacy coalitions seeking policy change. The policy-making environment in Argentina differs substantially. Argentina's women's policy agency is located within an under-resourced bureaucracy with very weak policy capacity. Moreover, the National Women's Council has been repeatedly downgraded over the last decade, and does not command sufficient resources or influence to ensure that political leaders will respond to policy

failures by reforming ineffective legislation and devoting more state resources to addressing violence against women.

DOMESTIC VIOLENCE POLICY IN ARGENTINA AND CHILE⁵

Both countries adopted domestic violence legislation in 1994⁶, although the issue had been on the public agenda in both countries for many years. In 1988, the Argentine under-secretary for the Women and Family Senate Committee convoked a meeting of experts that included both legal authorities and representatives of women's organizations to discuss legislative initiatives on domestic violence. Much of the debate centered on whether family violence should be considered a crime or a "conflict." The latter idea won out and the bill that was eventually passed by congress incorporated the idea that domestic violence should be resolved by family courts rather than the criminal law (Birgin and Pastorini 2005). Argentina's Law 24.417 (Ley de Protección contra la Violencia Familiar) includes both physical and psychological violence. However, because Argentina is a federal state, the law initially only applied to the Federal Capital of Buenos Aires.⁷ The national law did, however, invite the provinces to create their own legislation in the area, which most did in the ensuing years. Nonetheless, there is substantial variation among provincial laws, and two provinces still lack their own legislation. Although numerous shortcomings of the laws and their application have been raised by state and non-state actors, there have not been any legislative reforms or significant policy changes.

⁵ See the tables in the Appendix for an overview of each country's laws, policies, and victim services.

⁶ The laws specify the procedures for reporting and prosecuting domestic violence, outline the types of protective measures that can be employed, and what kind of penalties are to be applied to perpetrators of family violence.

⁷ A 1994 constitutional reform established Buenos Aires as an autonomous entity, and in 1996 it adopted its own constitution and established its own legislature. The Autonomous City of Buenos Aires passed domestic violence legislation in 2003, a law that, according to some activists, is one of the most progressive in the country.

In Chile, Law 19.325 (Ley de Violencia Intrafamiliar) was adopted following lengthy negotiations within the governing coalition, and also between legislators and the women's policy agency, SERNAM (see Haas 2006). While an earlier bill introduced by legislators Sergio Aguiló and Adriana Muñoz focused on the gendered nature of domestic violence and sought tough sanctions for abusers, a much more scaled-down version of the bill was later introduced by SERNAM, prompting protests from the two legislators. Although SERNAM eventually withdrew its bill and agreed to support the bill introduced by Aguiló and Muñoz, their involvement led to a series of amendments to the original bill (Haas 2006). Largely due to the strength of conservative legislators in the Chilean congress, the bill that was finally approved emphasized protecting the family and ensuring that couples were reconciled through counseling and therapy, rather than punishing abusers with prison terms. As a result, feminists in Chile have been vocal critics of the law, viewing it as prioritizing family unity over women's rights to be free of violence. As a result of repeated criticisms by women's organizations, feminist legislators, and, eventually, SERNAM officials, a project for legislative reform emerged and a number of new policy directions were adopted. A revised domestic violence law (Ley 20.066), approved in 2005, incorporates domestic violence into the criminal code, increases penalties, and expands the use of protective measures. Other changes (discussed below) have occurred as well.

Accounting for these differences requires a closer look at the institutional context in each country and how this context creates opportunities and obstacles for advocacy coalitions.

Argentina: advocacy coalitions confront weak and decentralized institutions

Two factors complicate domestic violence policy implementation in Argentina: federalism and a weak women's policy agency located within an inefficient bureaucracy. Argentina is a relatively

decentralized federal state with twenty-three provinces and an autonomous federal district. Political decentralization in Argentina means that there is substantial variation in provincial policies on domestic violence. Essentially, women living in different provinces enjoy different levels of access to justice as well as varying levels of victim services. Some provincial laws require complainants to have legal representation in order for a case to proceed. However, in at least eight provinces, the law does not provide for the free provision of legal representation, effectively ensuring that poor women do not have access to justice (Birgin and Pastorino 2005, 301-302). Provincial laws also vary in terms of the protective measures that can be applied, and further differ in terms of what kinds of relations are covered by the term “family violence.” The law for the province of Buenos Aires is the only one that includes violence between boyfriends and girlfriends; all other laws refer to families linked by marriage or common law.

In addition to variation in the content of legislation, there is also substantial variation in terms of provincial governments’ commitments to domestic violence as a policy area. The fact that only four provinces have passed the legal regulations (*reglamentos*) that detail how the laws are to be implemented is evidence of the low priority that most provincial governments accord to domestic violence policy (Birgin and Pastorino 2005, 298-99).⁸ Also, not all provinces provide women with access to victim services such as crisis hotlines or attention centers that provide counseling or legal advice. A 2003 study found only eighteen victim service centers (Centros de Asistencia) operating throughout Argentina, a country with a population of over forty million people. Women’s police stations (Comiserías de la Mujer) also vary by province, existing in

⁸ While in the United States, it is the bureaucracy that sets regulations to implement legislation adopted by congress (although these agencies are themselves monitored by congress), in most Latin American countries, it falls to the executive to issue regulatory decrees that specify more precisely how the new legislation is to be implemented. Researchers have argued that this stage of the policy process is quite important, because the original aims of the legislation can be thwarted or undermined by the regulations, and congress tends not to have any oversight powers (see Díez 2006, 77).

some form in thirteen provinces (Bressa and Schuster 2003).⁹ Even where provinces have created services, there are frequent complaints about their ineffectiveness. One activist noted that the crisis hotline established by the provincial government in Buenos Aires only takes calls during the day, and that the crisis center has a budget that is so small it could only purchase one computer.¹⁰ Where shelters for victims of domestic violence exist, they tend to be run by NGOs, although three of the twenty shelters operating in the country are supported with some support from government. However, demand for spaces in the shelters far outstrips supply. As a result, some shelters restrict spaces to those who meet certain criteria (for example, mothers with children under the age of two) (Bressa and Schuster 2003). Finally, state programs for prevention and training of medical, police, and justice officials vary considerably across the provinces. In sum, political decentralization in Argentina means that women who become victims of domestic violence enjoy very different levels of services, protection, and legal support depending on the province in which they reside.

While federalism creates a vertically fragmented policy domain, Argentina's state institutions also suffer from low capacity in terms of horizontal coordination. A recent comparative analysis of public policy-making in Latin America ranked Argentina "low" on measures of enforcement and implementation, coordination and coherence, and efficiency (Stein *et al.*, 2006, 135). Another team of researchers studying public policy in Argentina observe that "political actors do not have a quality bureaucracy onto which to delegate policy implementation" (Spiller and Tommasi 2007, 156). These weaknesses are evident in the federal government's approach to policymaking on domestic violence. Until very recently, the federal

⁹ Recently, the names of the *Comiserías de la Mujer* in the province of Buenos Aires were changed to *Comiserías de la Familia*. Observers complain that while the initial focus was on the gendered nature of domestic violence and the stations were "women-centered," the main objective now is to facilitate the reconciliation of family members (*Página 12*, August 4, 2006).

¹⁰ Interview with María Luisa Storani (September 13, 2006).

government lacked an overarching national plan for addressing domestic violence and coordinating policies across departments.¹¹ Elsewhere in Latin America, multi-sectoral national action plans have been critical policy tools, setting out details for how the state will respond to domestic violence, including what the role of various agencies and departments will be, how policies will be coordinated, and how policy implementation will be monitored and evaluated. Argentina only adopted such a plan in 2006, when the CNM developed the National Action Plan to Eradicate Violence against Women in the Family and set up an Inter-Ministerial Committee with representatives from health, education, and social development.¹² The Committee is coordinated by the National Women's Council. Unfortunately, as discussed below, the CNM's own institutional weakness undermines its ability to be an effective actor in policy coordination.

The National Women's Council was first created in 1991 by Carlos Menem's government as an agency that reported directly to the President's office. Initially, the agency was well-staffed, well-funded, and headed by a respected feminist, Virginia Franganillo, who established open relations with women's organizations in the country. When conflict emerged between the CNM leader and President Menem over the preparations for the 1995 Beijing Conference, Franganillo resigned, and the agency lost influence, budgetary resources, and became more closed to women's organizations in society (Blofield 2006; Waylen 2000). Four years later, the CNM suffered further downgrading. In 1999 it was relocated to the Ministry of Social Action, and in 2002, it was placed under the mandate of the National Council for Social Policy Coordination. The agency also suffered a further round of budget cuts in 2000. Although movement activists and female legislators in Argentina have been vocal opponents of these

¹¹ The only federal plan that existed was the National Plan for Prevention and Attention to Family Violence, located within a subsector of the Ministry of Health (Guerrero 2002, Appendix 5). However, this plan did not involve other departments or ministries.

¹² The limited number of policy sectors involved indicates that this plan is not very ambitious as a policy tool. Policy sectors that are critical to domestic violence, such as justice and the police, are not involved.

changes, with some legislators introducing bills to restore the agency's earlier institutional rank, these efforts have been unsuccessful.¹³ In fact, despite Argentina's overall economic recovery following the 2001-2002 economic crisis, the CNM continues to suffer severe budget cuts. A newspaper report noted that between 2006 and 2007, the Council's budget was reduced by eighty percent (*Página 12*, July 17, 2007).

The institutional weakness of the CNM means that it has not been able to harness resources from other state institutions to develop and monitor domestic violence policy. Two principal problems create difficulties for domestic violence advocacy coalitions. First, the under-resourced CNM has not been able to conduct effective dissemination and public awareness campaigns. As a result, women often do not know about the laws' existence, and therefore do not know how to proceed if they are victims of violence.¹⁴ A survey conducted by the NGO Equipo Latinoamericano de Justicia y Género (Latin American Group for Justice and Gender) reveals a profound lack of knowledge among women about domestic violence laws and what kind of services are available to them. Only forty percent of respondents knew that domestic violence legislation existed and only thirty-three percent answered that victims of domestic violence should go to the police to lodge a complaint (ELA 2006, 117 and 123). A coordinated information system has just recently been created, and began operating in 2007. This system, which is supposed to contain an up-to-date registry of all domestic violence services available to victims in each province, involves coordination between the CNM and provincial women's offices. However, victims have to know to phone their provincial women's office to access the information. The phone lines are supposed to operate 24 hours a day, 7 days a week (*Clarín*,

¹³ Interviews with Cecilia Lipszyc, August 15, 2006, Buenos Aires; Haydee Birgin, August 24, 2006, Buenos Aires, and María Luisa Storani, San Fernando.

¹⁴ Interview with Graciela Barcaglioni, member of the Red Monitoreo de la Ley de Violencia Familiar de la Provincia de Buenos Aires, August 25, 2006, La Plata, Argentina. This criticism was also made by NGOs in their 2002 shadow report to Cedaw (n.a. 2002).

April 11, 2007). It is too early to tell whether this service will operate effectively and whether enough women will know how to access the information.

The lack of broader policy initiatives for raising public awareness is also problematic because it fails to send citizens the necessary symbolic message that violence against women is a serious social problem. This is important due to the critical role of public concerns about violence against women in generating political pressure for policy reform. As noted in the previous section, policy implementation is more likely to be effective when the public perceives a problem as serious (because only then will governments feel pressure to devote the appropriate resources). But, such a public perception is itself shaped by state action: public awareness campaigns and releasing data and other information about the extent of the problem are two important factors that influence public perceptions.

The public is far more likely to consider domestic violence a serious social problem that needs extensive state resources to resolve when activists and the media have access to data that indicates the scope of the problem and shows that state responses have been insufficient. This is the second problem that advocacy coalitions confront in Argentina. A common complaint made by activists and researchers is the absence of a centralized data registry that records domestic violence. According to a state report to the CEDAW committee in 2002, the CNM was in the process of creating a Domestic Violence Registry (CEDAW 2002). However, the CNM's website does not indicate whether this registry has been completed, and does not contain any data. An Inter-American Commission on Human Rights study on women's access to justice in Latin America indicates that Argentina continues to lag behind other states in terms of data gathering. As part of the study, countries were asked to report the number of complaints they had received from women who were victims of discrimination and violence, and Argentina was

unable to provide national data, reporting statistics from a mix of institutions, such as the national judiciary, Directorate for Women (City of Buenos Aires) and the provincial court of Buenos Aires (CIDH 2007, 82). The lack of data on the incidence of domestic violence is an indication of ineffective policy monitoring and evaluation.

The fact that neither the National Women's Council nor any other state agency is monitoring domestic violence is problematic for reform advocates both within and outside of the state. There is no state agency that is charged with monitoring domestic violence laws to make sure that once a complaint is registered, that the authorities carry out all the appropriate steps.¹⁵ There is no systematic information about the effectiveness of existing approaches to domestic violence policy. As a result, Argentine legislators working on domestic violence initiatives do not have access to concrete and reliable statistics that they could use to help support their arguments for legislative reform.¹⁶ Moreover, without national-level data, advocates for policy reform face more difficulties building public support. While newspapers frequently report on issues of domestic violence, and the ineffectiveness of state responses, the stories can only give statistics from municipal or provincial agencies because there are no national data on the incidences of domestic violence. But municipal and provincial figures fail to convey the sense that violence against women is a serious *national* problem requiring a federal government response.

While the CNM's lack of resources undermines its ability to conduct the policy research and monitoring that could aid advocacy coalitions lobbying for reform, the agency's lack of influence and power undermines its own ability to be an effective advocate for women's rights

¹⁵ Storani interview.

¹⁶ A senator's legislative assistant mentioned that she had made repeated requests for information to the CNM while helping the senator write a domestic violence bill, but did not receive a response. She speculated that the lack of response may have been because the CNM did not have the information, or because the senator was not from the majority party (Interview, September 6, 2006).

within the Argentine state. Its low status within the bureaucracy means that its director does not participate in cabinet meetings, thereby reducing its ability to lobby other relevant departments to give greater priority to domestic violence policy. Hence, women's organizations working on domestic violence lack influential allies inside the state. While the CNM clearly does prioritize domestic violence, it lacks both the resources and power to be able to change public perceptions about the scope of violence against women, thereby putting greater political pressure on governments to engage in meaningful policy reform.

While state institutions are relatively weak in Argentina, civil society is fairly well organized. Women's movements have remained active since the return of democracy, and have not suffered quite as much demobilization as elsewhere in the region. Organized women meet annually at the "Encuentros de Mujeres" (Women's Meetings) held at rotating locations throughout the country. The meetings draw approximately 15,000 organized women each year.¹⁷ A number of women's organizations and networks are in existence throughout the country, working in a variety of areas, including reproductive rights, violence against women, and political participation. Advocacy groups, however, face the challenge of having to confront two sets of institutions, those at the federal level and those at the provincial level. Interviews with feminist activists working on domestic violence in Argentina reveal activity on both levels. Activists meet with the CNM director to lobby for its institutional support for their organization's goals, and also network with female legislators in the national congress who have introduced bills to reform the domestic violence law, or to create national programs and registries. As well, a network of women's organizations in the province of Buenos Aires, the country's most populous province, has been actively lobbying the provincial government to

¹⁷ Interviews with Monique Altschul, *Mujeres en Igualdad* (Women in Equality), August 24, 2006, Buenos Aires, and Susana Pastor, *Feministas en Acción* (Feminists in Action), Buenos Aires, September 11, 2006.

improve the application of that province's law, although without much success (*Página 12*, August 4, 2006).¹⁸ Media reports from around the country indicate a wide range of provincial level advocacy groups lobbying for improvements to domestic violence policy and programs.

Although some comparative research finds that women's movement organizing is facilitated by the existence of federal state structures due to the multiple access points they offer, it is also the case that federalism increases the *costs* of advocacy. Activists must be capable of interacting with officials at both levels; this requires more knowledge, more time, and the ability to travel long distances. Given that members of advocacy organizations are often doing this work on a volunteer rather than professional basis (and often combine the activity with other forms of paid employment), the more complicated terrain posed by federal institutions is a hindrance rather than an opportunity. Moreover, even if advocates at the provincial level convinced their provincial governments to accord a higher priority to domestic violence programs, much of the funding for social policy comes from the federal government. Despite a considerable degree of expenditure decentralization in Argentina, the federal government enjoys more taxation powers, creating a vertical fiscal imbalance. Federal transfers to the provinces finance approximately half of the provinces' expenditures in Argentina (Stein *et al.*, 2006, 78; Tommasi, Saiegh and Sanguinetti 2001). Hence, in order for domestic violence programs to be adequately funded, advocacy coalitions must succeed in convincing the federal government to give the programs a higher priority in terms of budgetary outlays.

Another problem for domestic violence advocacy coalitions in Argentina is the absence of formal mechanisms for coordinated action between state and non-state actors. Although activists do not necessarily perceive the state as "closed," access to policy-making institutions

¹⁸ Interview respondents noted that their organization had formally requested information from the province's governor concerning application of the domestic violence law, but after many months, had received no response.

has not been formalized through the creation of a permanent commission to encourage information sharing or coordinate activities (especially in the realm of victim services). This has been a problem in Argentina because the lack of coordination means that government efforts sometimes duplicate services offered by NGOs rather than providing services that may be lacking. Likewise, some NGO workers complain that the state has off-loaded the provision of domestic violence programs onto them, without supporting them financially (Bressa and Schuster 2003).

In sum, the fact that domestic violence advocacy coalitions confront fragmented and weak institutions has undermined the possibilities for effective policy implementation. More important, the absence of policy monitoring and evaluation deprives reform advocates of concrete indicators of policy failure and ineffectiveness. This, in turn, undermines their ability to generate public pressure for policy reform. As I explain below, the context in Chile is considerably different.

Chile: advocacy coalitions, a strong bureaucracy, and influential insiders

The Chilean political context is marked by political centralization and strong institutions. According to Cristóbal Aninat et al., a key aspect of the Chilean policy process is “the existence of a well-functioning mechanism for policy implementation, including an independent judiciary and an honest and reasonably efficient bureaucracy” (2006, 7).¹⁹ Chile is a unitary state and, despite recent moves toward decentralization, its political institutions remain relatively centralized (ibid., 20). The National Women’s Service (SERNAM) was created through law in 1991, and while it is housed within the Ministry of Planning and Cooperation rather than being a

¹⁹ In a similar vein, a study by the Inter-American Development Bank ranked public policies in Chile “high” in terms of enforcement and implementation, coordination and coherence, and efficiency (Stein *et al.*, 2006, 135). Argentina ranked “low” on all of these measures.

ministry in its own right, its director has ministerial status and participates in cabinet meetings (Franceschet 2003). Moreover, SERNAM has seen its influence and resources grow since its creation and has not suffered the kind of institutional downgrading or drastic budget cuts that Argentina's CNM has experienced. Institutional stability and a relatively stable resource base have allowed SERNAM to research and coordinate policy initiatives in the area of domestic violence, and, most importantly, the scope of violence against women in Chile has been repeatedly highlighted through studies conducted by the agency. This reporting, combined with the deficiencies of the 1994 legislation reported by researchers and advocacy groups, informed public opinion and led to growing public concerns about the seriousness of violence against women.²⁰ Public concerns, in turn, prompted the last two Chilean governments (that of Ricardo Lagos, 2000-2006 and the current government of Michelle Bachelet) to place a greater priority on domestic violence. This has led to substantial policy reforms, including the creation of Family Tribunals to process domestic violence complaints, a major overhaul of legislation in 2005 that added domestic violence to the criminal code, and a thirty percent budget increase for SERNAM in 2006 to finance the creation of shelters for abused women throughout the country (CEDAW 2006a).

The domestic violence law passed by Chile's congress in 1994 was heavily criticized by women's organizations and researchers for its emphasis on conciliation processes and for incorporating family violence into the civil rather than criminal code. As a result, abusers were rarely punished with anything more than fines or compulsory therapy. Prison sentences were rare, even if cases went through the criminal courts, because judges often classified injuries as "light," meaning that the offense was a misdemeanor rather than a felony. Common judicial

²⁰ It is significant that advocacy groups who publish reports on domestic violence or distribute pamphlets or other informative documents use data from SERNAM's studies about the incidence of domestic violence.

practice in Chile considers all injuries “light” unless there is evidence of loss of work or need for medical treatment lasting at least two weeks (Culliton 1994). But criticisms also emerged about ineffective implementation of the law, largely due to lack of resources. Courts were overwhelmed with complaints, leading to lengthy wait times, no specific family courts were created to process cases, there was insufficient monitoring of sanctions, and there were too few places where victims could receive services (legal support and medical and psychological counseling). Despite the existence of victim attention centers, there were no shelters for women fleeing from abusive partners.

Even before adopting a domestic violence law in 1994, Chile’s government had created an Inter-Ministerial Commission on Family Violence. The Commission, created in 1992, was coordinated by SERNAM, and comprised representatives from health, justice, education, the police, and external affairs. More important, SERNAM also opened the door to the participation of advocacy groups in the commission, in particular, to the Red Chilena contra la Violencia Doméstica y Sexual (Chilean Network against Domestic and Sexual Violence, REDCHVD) (Araujo, Guzmán and Mauro 2000). After the law was passed, SERNAM continued to play a key role in various aspects of policy implementation and monitoring. SERNAM routinely conducts research on domestic violence, it created public awareness campaigns, disseminating information about policies and programs,²¹ engages in training public officials,²² and has created attention centers for victims. Following the creation of the law, six attention centers were created. Over the years, however, the number of victim attention centers has increased; by 2000,

²¹ In 1999, SERNAM launched a mass public awareness campaign with the theme “Mujeres con Derechos, Mujeres Ciudadanas” (Women with Rights, Women Citizens) The campaign included information about domestic violence, the 1994 law, and gave details on where victims could seek help and register complaints. Later on, another mass anti-domestic violence campaign was launched, specifically targeting young couples. This campaign included posters, radio and television spots, and educational videos (CEDAW 2004).

²² Between 1991 and 1999, approximately 24,000 public officials have received training in domestic violence (CEDAW 2004). According to one researcher, police training has been effective in Chile because of “the hierarchical structure and obedience of authority among Chilean police” (Culliton 1994).

there were twelve centers, and by 2007, there were thirty-three.²³ These centers have interdisciplinary teams of lawyers, social workers, and psychologists. However, shelters for victims were not created until 2006.

Through its activities, SERNAM has ensured that the problem of violence against women has remained a relatively high priority on the public agenda. The nature of SERNAM itself has a lot to do with the successful politicization of the problems of domestic violence policy and legislation in Chile. Unlike women's policy agencies elsewhere in Latin America, SERNAM has enjoyed a relatively stable budget (although it saw some budget cuts in the 1990s), and has maintained a large staff (over 200 persons) relative to other women's policy agencies (Guzmán 2001). According to some observers, one of SERNAM's key strengths is its legal reform department, staffed by four lawyers, which has been the main instigator of legislative reforms that promote women's rights.²⁴ Its resources have allowed it to conduct a substantial amount of research and policy monitoring of domestic violence, and the findings of its studies about the frequency and scope of domestic violence in Chile are often reported in newspapers, NGO campaigns, and in reports of international organizations. SERNAM's website reports national figures on domestic violence complaints, (broken down by region). This data has been crucial for advocacy coalitions lobbying for policy change and legislative reform.²⁵ Frequent reports in the media about the high number of women who suffer from violence contributed to growing public concern that the government was not doing enough to protect women from violent partners. A 2001 study by SERNAM found that almost half of all married Chilean women

²³ The number of victim attention centers (along with contact details) is listed on SERNAM's website, www.sernam.gov.cl. Note that while Chile's population is less than half the size of Argentina's (sixteen million people), there are almost twice as many victim services centers.

²⁴ Interview with Paula Del Canto, Corporación Humanas (a human rights lobby group), November 3, 2006, Santiago, and Patricia Provoste, Hexograma Consulting (feminist research NGO), November 15, 2006, Santiago.

²⁵ In an interview, the head of SERNAM's Legal Reform Department noted that having reliable data was crucial to convincing congress of the importance of women's rights initiatives (November 20, 2006), Santiago.

reported suffering some kind of violence, either physical or psychological in their lifetimes. The number of women suffering violence, combined with stories about inadequate penalties for abusers, created growing pressure for legal reform.²⁶

In 1999, legislators María Antonieta Saa and Adriana Muñoz introduced a bill to reform the 1994 domestic violence legislation. Because the Chilean political system gives the political executive substantial agenda-setting powers, the bill did not move forward until SERNAM itself became involved.²⁷ According to Saa, “the [Chilean] regime is very presidentialist, therefore if you’re not on the agenda of the government, it’s very hard for your issues to advance.”²⁸ Even after SERNAM became involved, the bill still took a number of years to pass. However, pressure for a government response continued to grow, and the bill finally passed by congress in 2005. Advocacy coalitions view the new law as an important achievement. The new law (Ley 20.066) incorporates the category of “habitual mistreatment,” which includes both physical or psychological violence, into the criminal code, and also establishes more mechanisms for judicial authorities to take precautionary measures. The law also increases the severity of penalties; those who fail to comply with the protective measures ordered by the judge can be sentenced to prison rather than simply fined. The law also creates duties for the state to train public officials and maintain data registries of domestic violence. It also permits SERNAM to sponsor domestic violence cases and provide legal representation to victims (SERNAM 2006; Senado de Chile 2005). Finally, the law’s effectiveness has also been enhanced by the creation of Family Tribunals charged with processing domestic violence complaints.²⁹ In 2006, SERNAM released

²⁶ A document on SERNAM’s website, outlining the reasons for a new domestic violence law notes that of the 78,900 domestic violence complaints received in 2004, only 780 of them resulted in sentencing the offender (SERNAM, n.d.).

²⁷ See Liesl Haas (2000) and Peter Siavelis (2000) for a discussion of Chile’s presidential system and the greater policy-making powers enjoyed by the executive branch.

²⁸ Author’s interview, November 28, 2006, Santiago, Chile.

²⁹ The Family Tribunals were created through a separate law (19.968) and began operating in October 2005.

a report that found a 151 percent increase in arrests for domestic violence following the adoption of the new law (*Santiago Times*, May 26, 2006). In addition to the new law, other policy changes have occurred, especially since the election of President Michelle Bachelet in 2006. Bachelet's commitment to gender issues has gone beyond rhetoric; in 2006 she increased SERNAM's budget by thirty percent to fund the creation of shelters for domestic violence victims.³⁰ In 2007, sixteen shelters opened across the country, one in each of Chile's thirteen regions, and three in the metropolitan region of Santiago. In total, the shelters have the capacity to serve 900 women annually (*Santiago Times*, March 27, 2007).

More recent events indicate that the process of legislative reform is likely not over. A series of brutal murders of women at the hands of partners and ex-partners within a relatively short period of time has led to growing public outrage about the incidences of "femicide." As of October 2007, fifty Chilean women have been murdered at the hands of current or ex-partners. Many media stories note that while Chile's figures for domestic violence are below regional averages, there is a much higher than average rate of "femicide." More important, media accounts note that up to half of the women murdered had lodged domestic violence complaints, leading to growing concerns that the judiciary, and the family courts in particular, have been ineffective (*El Mercurio* September 29, 2007 and October 2, 2007). This has elicited numerous responses by politicians. Between April and July of 2007, three legislative initiatives were introduced. One bill establishes "femicide" as a specific crime in the penal code. Another expands the existing domestic violence law to cover boyfriends, non-cohabitating partners, and ex-partners. A third bill would have all domestic violence proceedings go through the Ministry of the Public rather than Family Tribunals (*La Nación*, August 1, 2007). SERNAM has

³⁰ Author's interview with Silvia Musalem (SERNAM), November 23, 2006, Santiago. This same figure (a thirty percent increase) can be found in a summary of the CEDAW Committee's response to Chile's 2006 report. The Committee commended the Chilean government for increasing SERNAM's budget (CEDAW/C/CHI/CO/4).

expressed its support of these initiatives, as has the president. At the beginning of August, the government announced that it was giving these bills an “urgency” designation. This is an executive prerogative that requires a bill to be discussed within thirty days. Declaring a bill urgent signals the government’s commitment to an issue, ensuring that the bill does not simply languish in a committee without being discussed. Only one of the bills, that which adds femicide to the criminal code and increases sanctions for it, has received an urgency, however.³¹

Nonetheless, media attention has been consistent, and numerous legislators from across the party spectrum have either commented publicly that Chile needs to do more to address violence against women, or have introduced or supported legislation themselves. Both the president and the director of SERNAM have acknowledged that addressing femicide is a high priority.

In sum, advocacy coalitions working on domestic violence were constant critics of the 1994 legislation, and their criticisms were bolstered by the findings of SERNAM’s own studies about the prevalence of domestic violence and the inadequate penalties applied due to limitations in the law. Most important, non-state advocates for reform had allies on the inside, both in SERNAM and in the legislative branch. But, while Argentine advocacy coalitions also included feminist legislators who introduced reform legislation, these legislators did not have allies in the executive who were capable of supporting their initiatives (that is, the CNM does not play a legislative role). In Chile, it was only when SERNAM used its executive prerogatives in sponsoring the bill for domestic violence reform that the project’s success became more likely. Finally, the findings of studies of domestic violence conducted by SERNAM were frequently reported in the media, thereby creating growing pressure for governments to improve domestic violence policies. Although the number of Family Courts, shelters, and victim services centers

³¹ The bill was first introduced into the Chamber of Deputies in April 2007, and received its first urgency on July 31st. It received subsequent urgencies in September and October, but has still not been voted on in the Chamber (http://sil.congreso.cl/cgi-bin/sil_proyectos.pl?4937-18 Retrieved October 12, 2007).

remains insufficient to meet the need for these services, it is clear that the government is responding to advocacy coalitions by increasing the resources it devotes to domestic violence policy.

CONCLUSION

The analysis presented in this article offers both practical and theoretical lessons. Women's rights advocates as well as researchers of gender policy in Latin America need to pay more attention to what happens to gender policies after they are adopted. The goals of domestic violence laws and policies can be undermined by poor implementation. While part of the problem is insufficient budgets for domestic violence policies, a potentially more serious problem is the weak policy capacity of state agencies, especially women's policy agencies, that are charged with coordinating or monitoring policy implementation. Complex social problems such as domestic violence require coordinated policy efforts across a range of state agencies. Where bureaucratic agencies are inefficient, and the lead coordinating agency does not have much influence, then implementation failures are likely. The weakness of Argentina's National Women's Council stems from a number of factors. Argentina's bureaucratic institutions are notoriously inefficient; civil servants are poorly remunerated and governments have displayed little interest in strengthening bureaucratic capabilities (Spiller and Tommasi 2007). But the fortunes of the CNM have also been affected by changes in government. When new presidents enter office, they frequently re-organize bureaucratic institutions. The constant downgrading of the CNM has meant that it has been unable to play a strong "insider" advocacy role. Interviews with both legislators and movement activists reveal that women do not consider the CNM an effective ally in the struggle to promote women's rights.

The Chilean context differs considerably in ways that advantage domestic violence advocacy groups. A centralized state and strong and effective bureaucratic institutions have facilitated policy implementation. Nonetheless, policy failures did emerge, largely due to the inadequacies of the initial domestic violence law and insufficient budget resources allocated to the policy area. Most important though, these problems were detected through policy evaluation conducted by SERNAM. Thus, SERNAM officials were crucial “insider” allies for advocacy groups and legislators seeking policy reform. The 2005 legislative reform, along with increased state resources for domestic violence programs (such as shelters) occurred due to the successful politicization of the problems with the existing law and inadequate services for victims. Although the 2005 law is an improvement over its predecessor, it is not without its own shortcomings. And, even though the Bachelet government has increased the funding for domestic violence programs and services, the demand for attention continues to outstrip supply. Hence, it will be interesting to see whether advocacy coalitions, aided by insider support from SERNAM, can continue to push political leaders to do more to protect women from violence.

The comparative analysis presented in the article also shows the importance of women’s policy agencies. While a great deal of research has highlighted the shortcomings of these agencies, especially their problematic relationship to grassroots women’s movements (Alvarez 1999; Richards 2004; Waylen 2000), this article shows their potential importance in translating policy goals into more effective policy outcomes. Unfortunately, this is one area in which Latin American states are diverging rather sharply. While women’s policy agencies are being strengthened in institutional and budgetary terms in countries such as Brazil and Mexico, they continue to grow weaker in countries like Argentina. More comparative research is needed in this area to determine when and why governments choose to empower women’s policy agencies,

especially because, as I have shown in this article, empowering these agencies is likely to increase the chance that gender policies will improve women's lives.

Appendix

Table 1: Domestic Violence Legislation in Argentina and Chile

	Law	Year Adopted	Authority	Sanctions
Argentina	24.417 Protection Against Family Violence (national application in the Federal Capital)	1994	Family courts	Mandatory therapy, counseling
Chile	19.325 Law of Intra-Family Violence	1994	Civil courts	Up to 60 days in prison, fines, therapy
	20.066 Law of Intra-Family Violence (replaced Law 19.325)	2005	Family Courts* Criminal Courts**	Fines, therapy, up to 541 days in prison

*Family Courts were created in 2004 through Law 19.968

**Law 20.066 also adds the category of “habitual mistreatment” to the Criminal Code.

Table 2: Domestic Violence Policies and Programs in Argentina and Chile

	National Action Plan			State-Civil Society Partnerships	Training		Data Gathering and Reporting	
	Name of Plan/Year Adopted	Coordinating Agency	Sectors Involved		Coordinating Agency	Target Sectors		Reporting Agency
Argentina	National Action Plan of Prevention and Assistance for Family Violence/2000	National Directorate for Infant and Maternal Health (within Health Ministry)	None	none	National Women's Council	Health, judiciary, police	No national data	Directorate-General for Women, City of Buenos Aires
	National Action Plan to Eradicate Family Violence/2006	National Women's Council	Labor, Human Rights, Health, Education, and Social Development				Municipal data	
Chile	National Program for Prevention of Intra-Family Violence/1992	National Women's Service	Health, Education, Justice, External Relations, Judicial Power, National Police, Secretary-General of the Presidency, Secretary-General of the Government	<i>Red Protege</i> (Protect Network, includes Interministerial committee and NGOs)	National Women's Service	Judges, police, health professionals	National data	Reported by Police, Ministry of Interior, and SERNAM

Table 3: Services for Victims of Domestic Violence in Argentina and Chile

	Attention Centers	Shelters
Argentina	18 Centers of Assistance to Victims of Crimes*	none
Chile	33 Centers for Assistance and Prevention of Intra-Family Violence**	16**

*reflects data reported in Bressa and Schuster (2003)

**reflects data reported by SERNAM for 2007 (<http://www.sernam.cl/basemujer/index.htm>, retrieved September 26, 2007)

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